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1. Introduction
It is repeated as a mantra that neoliberal capital-
ism (neoliberal model of capitalism), which we, al-
legedly, practice, is to blame for the bad economic 
situation in Croatia. It was so at the beginning of 
the Croatian capitalist story, and so it is now. How-
ever, a “large”, expensive and inefficient state does 
not fit into this story, ostensibly imbued with great 
propensity towards the market.
A pragmatic sympathizer of the market1 (miles 
away from market fundamentalism) is deeply aware 
of the imperfection of the market. When it comes 
to malfunctioning of the market, things are fairly 
clear. Pareto suboptimality of the market (market 
failure) is caused by (at the microeconomic level)2 
market power (monopoly), public goods, imperfect 
– asymmetric information, externalities. Moreover, 
let us not forget that the market is a socially insensi-
tive mechanism – market distribution is extremely 
uneven.
A pragmatic liberal, however, is also deeply aware 
of the many imperfections of the state, that is, less 
precisely, the government. He is doubtful regard-
ing the ability of the state (government) to “fix” 
the market, always and infallibly, and ensure stable 
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Abstract
The debate about the relationship between state and market, about their relative importance, does not cease 
to be topical, and there is no end of it in sight. The market (invisible hand) does need, more or less, the 
help of the state (visible) hand. Liberal sympathizers of the market prefer a “small” state whose ambitions 
include only providing an adaptable legal framework in which and by which the market functions, and (re)
allocation of resources, because of the inherent defects of the market. Proponents of welfare economics will 
wish for progressive taxation and redistribution of income. Keynes’s mission to save capitalism meant an 
increase in the importance of the state and appearance of a new, stabilizing role of the state. Excessive un-
employment is to be prevented by fine-tuning. Unfortunately, Keynes’s critics from the public choice camp 
will say that the state (government) is not perfect, and, as a rule, falls into the trap of asymmetry. Only and 
solely in theory will it apply that a perfect state means perfect functioning of an imperfect market.
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economic growth. Croatia’s (and not just its) eco-
nomic actualities make him suspicious toward the 
“visible hand” and its abilities. A pragmatic liberal 
does not a priori perceive politics and politicians as 
a benevolent service that promotes public interest. 
Politics is, in his case, stripped of all idealizing and 
external shine.
Generally, we have become a bad society, a society 
that is unable to ensure solid economic growth. In 
a good society, “production and employment have 
to grow strongly and reliably each year. This reflects 
the needs and aspirations of the people who want 
to enjoy the greatest possible economic prosperity”. 
(Galbraith, 2007:30)
Is the bad society, which we have turned into, a con-
sequence, pro primo, of functioning of the “free” 
market? Is it possible to grant amnesty to the other 
side – state (government)? We believe that errors 
of the state (government failures) have contributed 
largely to such a situation. We believe, therefore, 
that failure of the state, government myopia can be 
much worse and have more serious consequences 
than those related to malfunctioning of the market.3
2. Mercantilism
Thomas Hobbes’s doctrine insists on the existence 
of a strong and absolute supreme authority as the 
assumption for a peaceful and civilized life. An al-
ternative to a strong sovereign (state), since man’s 
nature is basically flawed and selfish, and man is 
prone to strife and wars, is the “natural state”. So, 
when people live without a common authority that 
keeps them in “awe” (natural state) there is a war 
of everyone against everyone, which makes human 
life solitary, poor, and, of course, short. (Heyne, 
1987:3) Hobbes’s dilemma – state or anarchy – is a 
false, illusory dilemma. Time will turn this illusory 
dilemma into an actual dispute of such type – more 
state or less state.
The mercantilist answer is – more, much more state.
Thus, when it is believed that gold and silver rep-
resent wealth and when wealth can be increased 
(except in exceptional cases), only through foreign 
trade (active, positive trade balance), there is no 
choice but to restrict imports and encourage ex-
ports. The state, therefore, has a first-class role in 
conducting the “pulling money into the country” 
policy. Mercantilism is often described as a re-
sourceful and lucky blend of commercial and ruling 
interests. The symbiotic relationship between large 
merchants and rulers manifested in privileging and 
protecting merchants from, primarily, foreign, but 
also from domestic competition (customs duties 
and various forms of prohibition and restriction of 
imports, right to a monopoly, etc.) enabling them 
to generate revenues, which, through taxation, filled 
the ruler’s treasury. Standing armies were then ex-
tremely expensive, and the wars even more expen-
sive and frequent. Therefore, Jean Baptiste Colbert, 
the finance minister of Louis XIV, one of the most 
famous names of French mercantilism, will argue 
that trade is a source of public finances, and that 
finances are a vital means of warfare. (Spechler, 
1990:10) In order to increase wealth, mercantilist 
state resorts to detailed regulation of manufactur-
ing techniques in order to ensure quality of domes-
tic products, which will satisfy, primarily, foreign 
buyers. Thus, Colbert will prescribe that fabric pro-
duced in Dijon must contain 1408 fibres.
Definitely, “according to mercantilist understand-
ing, the state has the right and duty to intervene 
in economic life, with the aim to reach a certain 
predetermined economic impact for the individual 
and the community, which would not be achieved 
without this intervention, because economic life 
would have gone in another direction”. (Lunaček, 
1996:131)
Mercantilists believed in the ability of the state to 
direct economic life, and in the wake of that belief 
they have turned into (modern economics would 
say) rent seekers. Monopolistic privileges, protec-
tion from foreign competition, thanks to help from 
the state, have allowed merchants to generate high-
er profits. Alliance between traders and state also 
meant fuller state coffers. It is evident that here pri-
vate interest of one group of people was identified, 
declared as interest of the whole society.
In the long-lived and not entirely homogenous mer-
cantilist system there were also sparks, which when 
it comes to the role of state, anticipated the future. 
Our Matija Vlačić Ilirik only incidentally and rarely 
touched on economic issues. However, comment-
ing on Vlačić’s positions on basic economic objec-
tives of the state, Stipetić will argue that we could 
“include Vlačić in predecessors of welfare econom-
ics...”. (Stipetić, 2001:246) Namely, according to 
Vlačić’s dictum, the primary objective of the ruler’s 
policy should be the benefit (economic welfare, 
academic Stipetić would say) of subjects. “The first 
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basis and power of a good and praiseworthy (state 
administration – A/N) consists of two parts, name-
ly that both sides, the ruler and the subjects, enjoy 
prosperity and what belongs to them. First, rulers 
must be respected, that they are given due respect 
and obedience by the subjects. But then again, the 
ordinary man must have protection and defence, 
peace, they have to be given attention, discipline 
must be held, rulers have to build schools and im-
prove crafts... Power was given to rulers by God, not 
to use it to scare fair and honest people, but to pun-
ish those who do evil... The word of God requires 
that rulers do not abuse their power to their advan-
tage, as is unfortunately often the case, but to use it 
for the benefit of their subjects”. (Mirković, 1938:9)
It is possible that the following compliment will be 
highly forced, however, Vlačić’s explicit doubt in 
rulers’ always good and selfless intentions is unusu-
ally reminiscent of, “draw” on basic positions of the 
public choice theory.4 “It is clear as the sun that in 
our time everything revolves around the stomach” 
(Stipetić, 2001:246), but not only around the “stom-
ach” of common subjects, but also the rulers. There-
fore, already Vlačić would point to the fact that the 
virus of private, selfish interest, can affect even the 
supreme authority.
3. Physiocracy 
Physiocracy (the French reaction to mercantile 
teaching and practice) wants less state.
French mercantilist regulations (the so-called Col-
bertism) eventually became counter-productive. 
Namely, the rules governing the manufacture of 
some goods prohibited experimentation, innova-
tion and improvement of manufacturing techniques 
in general. Moreover, those rules became redun-
dant due to increased competition. Numerous trade 
privileges, granting monopolies, and restrictions of 
internal trade will also cause the physiocrats’ revolt. 
Colbert’s policy was too close to trading interests.
Teaching about natural order has the central posi-
tion in physiocratic teaching. Human society is con-
trolled by the natural order – natural laws “which 
were set by benevolent providence for the benefit of 
mankind...” (Roll, 1956:108) The physiocratic con-
cept of natural order takes into account the laws 
that are superior to the laws of any monarch, which 
automatically govern human affairs. (Newman, 
1952:41)
“Natural order (Quesnay would argue – A/N) is an 
outpour of God’s will, and is therefore eternal and 
immutable... Natural order in the economic sphere 
is therefore exercised through the right of own-
ership and economic freedom for every citizen”. 
(Lunaček, 1996:241)
State intervention – granting monopolies, various 
regulations in favour of traders, etc. – is clearly con-
trary to the natural order. According to physiocrats, 
the state has to follow the rule of theological laissez- 
faire; things should be left to themselves because 
they are governed by a higher force that ensures the 
best possible result.
Agriculture gained the dominant position in physi-
ocratic teaching. Namely, only agriculture is able 
(thanks to the production power of nature) to cre-
ate a pure product (produit net). Agriculture is the 
true source of wealth.5 Other human occupations 
are sterile.
For this very reason, physiocratic liberalism meant 
freedom in the manufacture and trade of goods, re-
duction or abolition of road-tolls, improvement of 
transport infrastructure and, especially, elimination 
of the tax system that was truly exhausting agricul-
ture, and introduction of a unified tax on the pure 
product, that is pure land rent.
The absolute norm of laissez-faire, however, be-
cause of the special place of agriculture as an exclu-
sive source of wealth becomes relativized. Replacing 
mercantilist policy with a policy that would favour 
agriculture and related interests required, despite 
the principled condemnation of state control and 
regulation, a quite active state. “Thus Quesnay 
preached laissez-faire and free trade as an absolute 
standard of political wisdom. But those imperatives 
should be viewed in the light of physiocratic opposi-
tion to all kinds of privileges and many things that 
they perceived as misuse, among other monopolis-
tic positions. Since those cannot be abolished with-
out significant state “interference”, Quesnay had 
demanded a truly active government policy, and 
certainly not that it doesn’t do anything”. (Schum-
peter, 1975:190)
Furthermore, physiocrats have, relaxing the restric-
tions imposed on agricultural production, advo-
cated subsidies for farmers, legal limitation of inter-
est rates so as to reduce the cost of borrowing for 
landowners, and restricting exports of manufactur-
ing products since boosting those exports results in 
lower food prices, in order for the costs of manufac-
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turing of products intended for export to be accept-
ably low. (Medema, 2003:432)
This, still selective interpretation of laissez-faire, 
did not diminish the glory of physiocrats as fierce 
promoters and protectors of economic liberalism.
4. Classical economics
Adam Smith (the first and most important) wants a 
state that is more than a “night watchman”.
Strong and impressive was Smith’s criticism of 
the trade system of political economy (mercantil-
ism), but also of the agricultural system of political 
economy (physiocracy). “If the twig, as the proverb 
goes, is bent too much to one side, it must be bent 
as much to the other side in order to straighten it. 
It seems that the French philosophers who have 
proposed a system that shows farming as the only 
source of income and wealth of each country adopt-
ed that principle of folk wisdom. As the diligence 
of cities is certainly overestimated compared to the 
diligence of villages in Mr Colbert’s plan, it seems 
that the diligence of cities is certainly underesti-
mated in the system of the French philosophers”. 
(Smith, 2005:644)
Incarnation of the wealth of nations is not gold and 
silver money, nor is it an agricultural pure product, 
just as the source of wealth is not foreign trade nor 
(only and solely) agriculture. The source of wealth, 
according to Smith’s dictum, is production in gen-
eral, and wealth of a country is the annual product 
of its soil and labour. (Smith, 2005:260)
Smith holds favouring of a very specific private 
interest and its identifying with society’s interest 
harmful to society. There is no place for the privi-
leged in Smith’s “system of natural liberty”– liberal-
ism of an entirely secular nature.
It should, therefore, be allowed “for every man to 
follow their interest in their own way on the lib-
eral basis of equality, freedom and justice”. (Smith, 
2005:643) Human instinct for acquiring and stand-
ing out, human endeavour to improve own and well-
being of those closest to them, human selfishness 
is able to discard ethically and morally acceptable 
results. The selfish human, human covered in blood 
under the skin, wants only and solely his winnings. 
“However, an individual usually does not intend to 
promote the public interest, nor knows how much 
he promotes it... In that case, as well as in many 
other cases, he is led by an invisible hand, to pro-
mote the goal he never intended to achieve. The fact 
that it was not an individual’s intention to promote 
the society’s goal, is not always worse for the soci-
ety. When he follows his own interest, he often pro-
motes the interest of society more effectively than 
when he is indeed trying to promote it”. (Smith, 
2005:446) “Human egoism can be put to the service 
of public interest. We do not expect lunch out of 
benevolence of a butcher, brewer or baker, but out 
of their keeping of their own interest. We don’t ad-
dress their humanity, but their selfishness, and we 
never talk to them about our needs, but about their 
benefits”. (Smith, 2005:52)
Private interest should not be limited (except for 
laws of justice); it should not be directed since such 
efforts harm wealth creation. The natural liberty 
system demands a different role of state than it was 
before, especially in the mercantilist, but also in the 
physiocratic system. 
“It is obvious that every individual in their local po-
sition can judge much better than any statesman or 
legislator what type of handcraft can employ their 
capital and which product will probably have the 
greatest value. A statesman who would attempt to 
determine how private individuals should use their 
capital, would not only be burdened by the most 
unnecessary concern, but would also take power 
that cannot be safely entrusted not only to any indi-
vidual, but not to any council or senate, and which 
would be the most dangerous in the hands of a man 
who is crazy or vain enough to deem himself com-
petent to exercise it”. (Smith, 2005:446)
Smith’s natural liberty system favours a quite pecu-
liar amalgam of market and state – dominant market 
and subsidiary state. But, we hold that the Smith’s 
state was however more than a “night watchman”. 
Namely, Smith’s political economy is exploration of 
the nature and causes of wealth of nations. But only 
in the hands of “statesman or legislator is it capable 
of accomplishing two different objectives: first, pro-
cure subsistence or abundant income to the people, 
or better: enable people to procure subsistence or 
abundant income for themselves: and second, sup-
ply the state or community with income sufficient 
for public services”. (Smith, 2005:419) 
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Smith’s dominant market needs a state that is com-
mitted to ideas of individualism and liberalism. The 
state cannot govern economic life, but without that 
“visible hand” (which creates and maintains the le-
gal and other frameworks) there is no constructive 
discharge of energy of private interest. Some (Rob-
bins, 1952:56) will go as far as to suggest that Smith’s 
“invisible hand” is in fact the government itself. It is 
not, therefore, some deity’s hand or hand of some 
natural force independent of human activity; it is 
the legislator’s hand, the hand that prevents private 
interests from  engaging  in activities that are con-
trary to the public interest. 
Listing the functions of the state – ruler (defence, 
judiciary), Smith would assert, since market is not 
an undisturbed good (his “hostile” attitude toward 
monopoly is well-known, as well as anticipating 
the market’s inability to produce what will later 
be called public good by economic theory), that it 
is the state’s duty to establish and support “those 
public institutions and those public works, which, 
although they may be useful to the fullest extent for 
a large society, are of such a nature that their profits 
could never recoup expenditures to an individual or 
a small number of individuals, because of which it 
cannot be expected that they would be established 
or supported by an individual or a small number of 
individuals”. (Smith, 2005:696)
Smith’s role of the state, therefore, is tied to the 
function that is today known as allocation of re-
sources. (Tanzi, 2011:52)
Smith did not challenge the necessity to help the 
very poor, but he did not consider it to be the task of 
the state, but of religious municipalities. Smith did 
not deem help to the needy as redistribution of in-
come, but a way to avert potential problems brought 
on by poverty. (Tanzi, 2011:59 ) And, finally, there 
is no place for stabilizing the role of the state in 
Smith’s teaching, and there is also no understand-
ing (just as in other classics) for the budget deficit 
(except, according to Smith, in some very special 
circumstances – wars, for example).
These positions will be the commonplace of eco-
nomics until Keynes’s revolution.
It is different, however, with the redistribution role 
of the state.
5. Neoclassical economics
Interesting is the way in which Arthur C. Pigou 
(theoretical father of welfare economics) tears down 
orthodox barriers and  opens wide the (theoretical) 
doors to the redistribution function of the state.
Namely, the classical doctrine argued that the mar-
ginal utility of money for its owner, as opposed to 
the marginal utility of other goods, does not decline. 
The established theory furthermore asserted that 
it is not possible to compare utility (satisfaction) 
of different people. “Larger quantities of a certain 
good provide the user with a decreased marginal 
satisfaction (according to the Gossen’s First Law – 
A/N). But it was not possible to say that to a man 
with more goods additional quantity of those goods 
provides less satisfaction than to those who have 
less. Feelings of different people were not compara-
ble: such comparisons would be a denial of scientific 
ways of thinking to which all good and prominent 
economists aspired”. (Galbraith, 1995:157)
Pigou has, however, made a significant departure 
from that direction of classical thought. Following 
Jevons’s and Marshall’s teaching, according to which 
marginal utility of money declines by increasing its 
quantity, Pigou will argue that “greater equality of 
incomes, in certain circumstances, may increase 
economic well-being”. (Oser, 1970:379)
“Every transfer of income from a relatively rich man 
to a relatively poor man of similar character, since 
it enables satisfying a stronger need on the account 
of a need of lower intensity, must increase the total 
sum of satisfactions”. (Pigou, 1932:89) In short, due 
to the declining utility of money, a poorer man is in 
the position to draw greater utility from additional 
income than a wealthier man. It was, as Galbraith 
had said (1995:157), a strong support to the redis-
tribution role of the state.
However, Pigou will once more betray the classical 
orthodoxy. Specifically, he will oppose the idea that 
what is good for the individual is necessarily good 
for the society. In this regard, he differentiates the 
marginal social cost and marginal social benefit 
and the marginal private cost and marginal private 
benefit. Marginal private cost directly burdens the 
producer of an additional unit of a good or service. 
Marginal social cost is the cost or damage suffered 
by society because of production of an additional 
unit of a good or service. Marginal private benefit 
is determined by the selling price of a good, while 
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marginal social benefit is the total benefit that pro-
duction of an additional unit of a good brings to the 
society. Social cost can be higher than the private 
cost, as there is a cost in addition to the private, 
which burdens the third, adjacent side. In this case, 
it is a negative externality because the marginal pri-
vate net product is greater than the marginal social 
net product. A positive externality occurs when the 
marginal private net product is smaller than the 
marginal social net product. In this case, someone 
is spilling benefit with their activity and “rewards” 
benefit to the aforementioned third, adjacent side.
So, when positive or negative externalities occur, 
when positive or negative effects for the third, social 
side occur, the state is obliged to resort to extraor-
dinary measures – extraordinary incentives or ex-
traordinary restraints. When the market fails, when 
there is a mismatch of marginal private net product 
and marginal social net product, the state should 
equalize them using extraordinary measures – sub-
sidies, taxes or legal regulations, with the goal of 
increasing prosperity. Pigou was optimistic regard-
ing the ability of the state to correct the mistakes of 
the market. His “theory shows that perfect markets 
function perfectly, imperfect markets function im-
perfectly, and a perfect government can cause per-
fect functioning of imperfect markets”. (Medema, 
2003:440)
6. Keynes’s economics of demand 
Classical and neoclassical economics were not bur-
dened with macroeconomic issues. The stabilizing 
role of the state was not current. Thus, until the ad-
vent of Keynes, all economics was microeconom-
ics. The reason for that was another “product” of 
classical economics – Say’s law. Say’s law will argue 
that supply creates its own demand. This simple 
statement means that the total income earned by 
producing an output must be equal to the value of 
that output, and that there is no loss of purchasing 
power in the economy – people save only to the ex-
tent to which they invest. If people save more than 
they invest, prices drop to accommodate smaller 
income. Consumption is again ensured, and pur-
chasing power unchanged. (Galbraith, 1995:57) The 
capitalist economy, according to Say’s interpreta-
tion, is automatically securing full employment and 
high growth rates. Despite some doubts expressed 
from within classical ranks (Malthus, for example) 
Jean Baptiste Say and his law have ruled until the 
Great Depression. The Say’s law and (neo)classical 
liberal paradigm were then abolished by  Keynes’s 
revolution. The essence of new, Keynes’s teaching is 
the deficit financing of state spending in order to, 
in times of crises, stimulate aggregate demand and 
thus decrease unemployment, that is, ensure full 
employment. 
Unemployment is the problem that Keynes is try-
ing to solve and thus save capitalism.6 Solving the 
problem required a different and more significant 
(stabilizing) role of the state. Keynes considers that, 
as he stated in a letter to Roosevelt, “increase of na-
tional purchasing power is absolutely the most im-
portant, an increase resulting from governmental 
expenditure, which is financed by loans”. (Harrod, 
1951:121) Namely, if savings surpass investments,7 
spending will be reduced and inventories will be 
accumulating, the number of employees is reduced 
and production is reduced. The therapy imposes it-
self. The harmful effects of savings have to be sup-
pressed, which is achieved through investing by the 
state. Thus, a balance can be achieved at a high level 
of production and full employment.
The state, therefore, and this is Keynes’s basic mes-
sage, must be responsible for creating the conditions 
of full employment. In short, Keynes recommends 
increasing state spending in times of crisis. Both fis-
cal and monetary policies are becoming powerful 
tools for stabilizing the business cycle. Keynes sig-
nificantly changes the classical relationship between 
market and state, in favour of the state.
Unemployment was a first-class problem. It is in-
teresting, however, that Keynes “was not a passion-
ate social reformer”. (Skidelsky, 2000:265) Despite 
revolutionary reversal in economic thought, there 
is no clear statement by Keynes that a state must 
strengthen social justice, that is, a welfare state.8 
For Keynes, in our opinion, realization of full em-
ployment was the way of “treating” injustice and 
inequality.
Expanding the functions of the state can be per-
ceived as undermining individualism, but Keynes 
sees this strengthening of the state as the only prac-
tical means of preserving capital and personal ini-
tiative. The economic advantages of individualism, 
which are a consequence of use of private interest 
and its efforts on economic efficiency and inno-
vation, can be preserved despite the existence of 
strong state intervention.
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“Therefore I imagine that socialized investing will 
to a significant extent turn out to be the only way 
to ensure nearly full employment, but that does not 
exclude a series of compromises and ways in which 
public authorities collaborate with private entre-
preneurs. But beyond that, it is difficult to derive 
obvious advantages of a system of state socialism, 
which would encompass most aspects of economic 
life of the community. Taking over the ownership 
of the means for production is not the key thing 
that the state must do”. (Keynes, 1987:213) If the 
capitalist economy and its survival require an ex-
panded role of the state, the entire system of capi-
talist individualism obviously cannot be brought 
into question. Therefore, in Keynes’s opinion, in his 
teaching “there remains a very wide field of action 
for the manifestation of private entrepreneurship 
and individual responsibility. The usual advantages 
of individualism will apply in those areas”. (Keynes, 
1987:214)
But who, in Keynes’s view, should run the state, who 
should lead the economic policy of full employ-
ment, stabilization policy?
Keynes believed that the (British) political sys-
tem will be in the hands of, that is, the economic 
policy will be led by the intellectual elite recruited 
from the upper middle class (to which he himself 
belonged), which shared his views with regard to 
public service. His assumption is, thus, that eco-
nomic policy will be led by intellectual aristocracy, 
bureaucratic elite, capable and moral and therefore 
unencumbered by political bias and weaknesses of 
any kind. This Keynes’s position was once called 
“The Harvey Road mentality”9 and was the subject 
of strong criticism, primarily by the theory of public 
choice. Solomonic wisdom and integrity of a saint, 
which Keynes assumes in the conduct of public af-
fairs, contradict his own personal experience and 
opinion about politicians, which he had the oppor-
tunity to acquire as a public servant, in the time be-
tween World War I and World War II. Terms such 
as half-crazy, lunatic in power, horrible and inhu-
man nonsense, which Keynes used to describe some 
of the politicians of the time, definitely cannot be 
perceived as compliments to the homo politicus. 
(Buchanan, Wagner, Burton, 1978:48) Nevertheless, 
Keynes did not change his presumption of impec-
cable and moral intellectual aristocracy.
7. Neoliberal criticism of the Keynesian state
The theoretical father of neoliberalism – Friedrich 
Hayek was one of the first and fiercest critics of 
Keynes.
The crucial difference between Keynes’s and Hayek’s 
teaching is understanding the conditions that will 
provide an environment in which entrepreneurship 
will be the most productive. For Keynes, uncertain-
ty and lack of knowledge do not mean that there is 
nothing we can do, while for Hayek uncertainty and 
lack of knowledge dictate us to do nothing and let 
the social order overcome the unimaginable com-
plexity of economic life. (Parsons, 2003:62)
Dispersed and limited knowledge can be coordi-
nated only and solely by a price system. “Price sys-
tem enables entrepreneurs, taking into account a 
relatively small number of prices, just as an engine-
driver monitors hands of a small number of dials, to 
adapt their activities to the activities of other entre-
preneurs”. (Hayek, 2001:82)
The market – competition is the very best coordina-
tor of individual efforts, but also guardian of indi-
vidual freedoms. The state, i.e. a certain type of state, 
is seen by Hayek as a threat to freedom. “Centralised 
planning assumes that problems are solved by the 
community instead of the individual, which further 
assumes that the community, that is, its representa-
tives, decide about the relative importance of vari-
ous needs… Economic control is not merely control 
of a single area of human life, separable from the 
others; it is the control over the means necessary for 
all our goals. Those who oversee those means must 
decide which objectives should be served, which 
values should be valued more, and which less, what 
should people believe in and what should they as-
pire to”. (Hayek, 2001:116)
Although, therefore, the state (the state that wants 
to “consciously manage” social resources) can 
threaten individual freedoms, Hayek’s neoliberal-
ism does not claim that the market and individual 
freedoms can survive without the state. The market 
cannot take care of everything. “In no system that 
can be rationally defended would the state just do 
nothing”. (Hayek, 2001:73) The first assumption of 
functioning of the market system is a “smartly or-
ganised and constantly adaptable legal framework... 
preventing fraud and deception (including abuse of 
ignorance), is a big, and in no case yet fully achieved 
objective of legislative activity”. (Hayek, 2001:73) 
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Hayek will also not oppose the state’s (re)allocation 
activity in the case of production of public goods, 
and state intervention will be caused by emergence 
of externalities.
State services, Hayek says, are in accordance with 
the liberal tradition as long as, among other things, 
“raising funds through taxation is carried out ac-
cording to uniform principles and taxation is not 
used as an instrument of redistribution of income”. 
(Mises, Hayek, 1997:181) Hayek’s state is definite-
ly not a welfare state, but social sensitivity is not 
lacking. Hayek’s state has to provide certain secu-
rity (the first type of security, which, according to 
Hayek, is security available to everyone and does 
not represent a privilege) to everyone. 
Hence, “there is no reason why in a society that has 
reached a general level of well-being (which our so-
ciety has reached) the first level of security should 
not be guaranteed to everyone without endanger-
ing general freedom... There is no doubt that eve-
ryone can be secured a certain minimum of food, 
residence and clothing, sufficient for maintaining 
health and working ability... Where – as in case of 
illness and accident – the desire to avoid trouble 
and efforts to overcome their consequences do not 
help..., the reasons for the state’s assistance in or-
ganization of comprehensive welfare systems are 
very strong... There is no principled irreconcilability 
between the state which thusly provides greater se-
curity and the preservation of personal freedom... 
Increasing security through the state’s aid to victims 
of “acts of God”, such as earthquakes and floods, be-
longs to the same category”. (Hayek, 2001:140)
Hayek recognizes mass unemployment as one of 
the most difficult problems of our time. Naturally, 
the Keynesian policy of realization of nearly full 
employment does not suit him because overall 
economic activity increasingly has to depend on 
the “direction and size of government spending”. 
(Hayek, 2001:141)
Many economists are looking for the remedy for un-
employment in the field of monetary policy, which, 
according to Hayek (2001:141), is not incompatible 
even with the nineteenth century liberalism. With 
this, Hayek announces the emergence of monetar-
ism and his successor Milton Friedman.
Monetarists’ attention is focused on the problem 
of inflation. Functioning of the economy is much 
more stable than it is presumed by the Keynesian 
model. Therefore, deficit spending of the “big” and 
very active Keynesian state, in order to mitigate the 
business cycle, makes the economy extremely vul-
nerable to inflation. Keynes did not, monetarists 
say, sufficiently understand the importance of the 
supply of money and favoured fiscal over monetary 
policy. And precisely a self-regulating, market-
steered economy necessarily needs a stable mon-
etary framework.
Namely, Friedman will says, based on studying 
monetary history, that depressions are related to a 
decrease of money in circulation (and vice versa), 
and that strong inflations are always accompanied 
by a significant increase in the quantity of money 
(and vice versa).
“The Great Depression that gripped the United 
States was not a sign of inherent instability of the 
system of private enterprise, but testimony of the 
damage a few individuals can cause when they have 
vast power over the monetary system of a country 
in their hands”. (Friedman, 1992:59)
Discretionary monetary policy poses a threat to 
individual freedom since independent monetary 
power to the greatest extent affects prices and em-
ployment in the economy. Monetary power should 
be reined in, unskilfully managed discretion mon-
etary policy10 subjected to rules in order for it to 
cease doing harm to individuals and the economy 
as a whole. Friedman’s monetary rule mandates that 
the growth of money supply is aligned with attain-
able economic growth.11
The neoliberal monetarist basket consists of the 
state, “muffled” in Friedman’s way (monetary policy 
is restrained by monetary rule, and similar is true 
for fiscal policy – it has to be managed according 
to the balanced budget principle12), and the stand-
ard (neo)liberal faith in the market as the very best 
protector of economic and political freedoms. But, 
according to Friedman’s dictum also, the market 
cannot exist without the state, and, since it is not 
perfect, it needs the state “that conducts law and 
order, establishes ownership rights, serves as a 
means  to modify ownership rights and other rules 
of the economic game, which arbitrates disputes 
over interpretation of the rules, ensures the impor-
tance of contracts, promotes competition, ensures 
monetary framework, engages in activities against 
technical monopolies and is trying to overcome 
neighbouring effects that are generally deemed im-
portant enough to justify state intervention, a state 
that complements charity and family in protecting 
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the unaccountable, whether mentally deranged or 
children”. (Friedman, 1992:44)
Friedman considers discretionary macroeconomic 
“meddling” of the state to be ignorant and harmful, 
and restricts it with rules. When given discretionary 
powers, the “visible hand” brings more harm than 
good.
The belief that the state (government) is imperfect 
will be deepened and strengthened by the teaching 
of the theory of public choice. The main difference 
between the public choice economists and oth-
ers (the so-called conventional understanding of 
politics) is that others believe politicians, and those 
prone to the theory of public choice do not.
Classical – neoclassical presumption of rationality 
(but also selfishness) of humans in the economic 
sphere of their life will be expanded to other as-
pects (political, public) of human life by Buchanan 
and Tullock. There is no, or it is extremely difficult 
to define, public interest. There are only partial, 
individual interests and goals. Therefore, political 
power will not free you of your personal or group 
interests – political power is not going to make you 
impeccable. The state (government) is a priori not a 
benevolent agent with only the interests of the pub-
lic in mind. Government failure is the consequence 
of the simple fact that government is comprised of 
rational people, who, naturally, take care of their 
own interests and the interests of groups close to 
them, people who want to maximise their utility 
(the government is seeking to increase its power, in-
fluence, re-election, etc.). Therefore, it is necessary 
to limit political power with detailed rules, that is, 
laws. Like Friedman, representatives of the public 
choice theory advocate a balanced budget. It should 
not come as a surprise that some are proposing a le-
gal ban on budget deficit. And again, the state, such 
as it is, does more harm than good.
After presenting things in that manner, the ques-
tion arises: How did Keynes acquire hard and even 
(somewhat) naive faith in the political elite?
Buchanan, Wagner and Burton (1978:47,48) are go-
ing to search for the foundations of Keynes’s faith in 
the political elite (the so-called Harvey Road men-
tality) in his belief that unquestionably responsible 
and capable intelligence is able to define public in-
terest. Wise and responsible – philosopher kings 
(such as the philosopher in Plato’s “The Republic”) 
are able to lead Britain using methods of persua-
sion. The said intellectual aristocracy is capable of 
convincing the public in the correctness of the cur-
rent policy.
Keynes did not consider the possibility that the 
elite is malevolent (consumed with their own, and 
not the public interest). Progressive growth of state 
spending was indeed not the aim of Keynes’s eco-
nomics. However, stabilization policy (Keynesian 
insistence on a near natural rate of unemployment 
and the corresponding level of aggregate demand) is 
very often accompanied by asymmetry, which leads, 
over a longer period of time, to an increasing share 
of state spending in the gross domestic product. 
Progressive growth of state spending, emergence 
and growth of budget deficit, growth of public debt 
can be regarded as by-products of Keynesian ortho-
doxy.13 So, the reason for that is the willingness of 
policy creators to increase public spending during 
the recession, but not (it is more comfortable that 
way) the readiness to decrease state spending dur-
ing the expansion. (Tanzi, 2011:126)
For the school of public choice, the rhetoric of pub-
lic interest, which is used by both politicians and 
bureaucrats, is in the function of concealing the fact 
that both are acting in a manner that ensures maxi-
mization of political and bureaucratic interests. 
(Parsons, 2003:66)
The market, evidently, has many shortcomings and 
deficiencies, but so does the state. The latter may be 
more difficult and worse than those of the market. 
8. Instead of a conclusion
The debate about the relationship between state 
and market, about their relative importance, does 
not cease to be topical, and there is no end of it in 
sight.14 An optimal amalgam of state and market has 
not been patented yet. This, of course, should not 
be surprising, since both components are far from 
perfect. Actual markets are, more or less, far from 
their role model – a market of perfect competition. 
However, it is excessive to claim that the “invisible 
hand” is invisible because it does not exist. Nobody 
disputes that the market (invisible hand) needs the 
help of the state (visible) hand.
Liberal sympathizers of the market prefer a “small” 
state whose ambitions include only providing a le-
gal framework in which and by which the market 
functions, and (re)allocation of resources, for the 
purpose of correcting the inherent defects of the 
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market (public goods, externalities, monopolies, 
etc.). Neither Hayek nor Friedman provide a justi-
fication for progressive taxation and redistribution 
of income, but there is no denying the necessity to 
help the needy. This is certainly not sufficient for the 
supporters of welfare economics.
Keynes’s mission to save capitalism meant an in-
crease in the importance of the state and appear-
ance of a new, stabilizing role of the state. Growth 
of state spending financed by loans had been the 
breakthrough remedy, with the purpose to, in times 
of recession, ensure a satisfactory level of aggregate 
demand and an acceptable, for capitalism and its 
health, harmless, benign level of unemployment.
However, Keynes’s critics from the public choice 
camp will say that his stabilization policy is coupled 
with an extremely dangerous companion. The fa-
mous asymmetry, growth of state spending, growth 
of budget deficits, growth of public debt, is a conse-
quence of Keynes’s economics, since it has removed 
former classical barriers to the growth of state 
spending. One of the biggest mistakes of the state 
(government) is the accumulation of budget defi-
cits, over-indebtedness, which, we have witnessed, 
prevents the realization of Keynes’s anti-cyclical 
policy. The size of state spending or public debt, as a 
too high percentage of the gross domestic product, 
is most often an indicator of government failure.
To get the best of both worlds, state and market, 
would possibly entail such a combination of the two 
(market paternalism, cohabitation of two orthodox-
ies, a hybrid of liberalism and Keynesian paternal-
ism) that sought to remove the “real” market fail-
ures, which will more closely regulate the market 
instead of replacing it with non-market arrange-
ments, which will not fall into the trap of asym-
metry, which will keep state spending focused and 
efficient and which will endeavour more strongly to 
eliminate the growing inequalities in the society.
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(Endnotes)
1  “If it turns out that functioning of the market inflicts real damage to the community and if it is proved that some form of restriction 
or replacement of the market with another mechanism of social coordination can correct operation of the market, there is no dogma-
tic argument why the free market should be defended to the last drop of blood”. (Šonje, 2005:107)
2  Keynes will waive the market’s ability, at the macroeconomic level, of realization of full employment.
3  Accumulation of extensive public debt, especially large and unfunded liabilities in pension and health care systems can be conside-
red obvious examples of short-sightedness of policy makers or government myopia. (Tanzi,2011) 
4  Authorities were not completely indifferent towards Vlačić’s criticism. Namely, “Vlačić personally handed the book (it is the most 
famous of Vlačić’s work “About the Transfer of the Roman Empire to Germans” – A/N) to Emperor Maximilian, who ordered Vlačić 
to be arrested the next day”. (Cerovac, 1980:46)
5  “Agriculture is the source of all wealth of the State and the wealth of citizens.” (Galbraith, 1995:39)
6  Keynes’s works, from 1920 to “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money” and later, are dominated by fear that libera-
lism and individual freedom are not going to survive if the role of the state is not aligned with economic life. 
7  Already in “A Treatise on Money” Keynes shows that the relationship between savings and investments (S=I) is not automatic. 
Savings does not always have to be translated directly into investments. Savings does not necessarily have to result in investments. 
Interaction of different variables will lead to equilibrium (S=I), but only over a long period of time. And, in a long time period, we are 
all dead.
8  “Certainly, he had little to do with the emergence of the welfare state”. (Tanzi, 2011:126)
9  Keynes’s family house was located in Harvey Road, Cambridge.
10  “Friedman’s perception of the functioning of the Board of Federal Reserve was similar to that of a nervous teenager who is learning 
to drive. When he presses the accelerator (i.e. increases the amount of money), our shy novice often gives the car too much fuel; 
when he steps on the brakes (decreases the amount of money), he does it too hard… Instead of a smooth movement on the path of 
economic growth, the economy is subjected to successive stoppages and movements, which causes inflation and / or depression...” 
(Ekelund, Hebert, 1997:550)
11  “This rule seems to me the only viable and currently available means with which we will transform monetary policy into a pillar of 
free society, instead of a threat to its foundations”. (Friedman, 1992:63)
12  Friedman also notes the asymmetry that accompanies the implementation of Keynesian fiscal policy in reality. Curbing unem-
ployment means an increase in state spending and an increase in the deficit. The decline in unemployment, expansion, logically, 
has to mean a decrease in state spending and the emergence of a surplus or at least a balanced budget. However, as Friedman says, 
the mechanism of balance is not balanced. The state, i.e. the state budget is in constant deficit. Namely, it is not good, and also 
politically very unpopular, to compromise “healthy” expansion by reducing state spending. “Both in monetary and fiscal policy, when 
we set all political considerations aside, we simply do not know enough to know how to use the conceived changes in taxation or 
spending as a sensitive mechanism of stabilization…” (Friedman, 1992:85-86).
13  Keynes’s idealized political ambiance is ruled by symmetry. Asymmetry, an almost continuous deficit financing of state spending, 
and related incurred budget deficits, are consequences of a state that is completely imperfect, and oriented to itself and its interests.
14 Fukuyama’s enthusiasm and optimism regarding the end of history and its happy ending (the perfect mix of state and market) was 
premature and exaggerated. 
UDK 330.82 / Preliminary communication
126 God. XXVII, BR. 1/2014. str. 113-126
Ivan Ferenčak
Boris Crnković
Stjepan Rudan 
Država i tržište
Sažetak
Rasprava o odnosu države i tržišta, o njihovoj relativnoj važnosti, ne prestaje biti aktualna i ne nazire joj 
se kraj. Tržištu (nevidljivoj ruci) jest potrebna, veća ili manja, pomoć državne  (vidljive) ruke. Liberalnim 
simpatizerima tržišta odgovara „mala“ država čije ambicije uključuju tek pružanje prilagodljivog pravnog 
okvira u kojemu i pomoću kojega tržište funkcionira te (re)alokacija potencijala, a zbog urođenih nedosta-
taka tržišta. Pristalice ekonomike blagostanja poželjet će progresivno oporezivanje i redistribuciju dohotka. 
Keynesova misija spašavanja kapitalizma značila je povećanje značaja države i pojavu nove, stabilizacijske 
uloge države. Fine tuning ima spriječiti prekomjernu nezaposlenost. Nažalost, reći će Keynesovi kritičari 
iz tabora javnog izbora, država (vlada) nije savršena i, u pravilu, upada u zamku asimetrije. Samo i jedino u 
teoriji će vrijediti da savršena država znači savršeno funkcioniranje nesavršenog tržišta.
Ključne riječi: država, tržište, merkantilizam, fiziokratizam, klasična ekonomika, ekonomika blagostanja, 
ekonomika potražnje, monetarizam, teorija javnog izbora, Harvey Road mentalitet
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